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A New Approach to Service 
Provisioning in ATM Networks 
Steven H. Low, Member, IEEE, and Pravin P. Varaiya, Fellow, IEEE 
Abstruct- We formulate and solve a problem of allocating 
resources among competing services differentiated by user traffic 
characteristics and maximum end-to-end delay. The solution 
leads to an alternative approach to service provisioning in an 
ATM network, in which the network offers directly for rent 
its bandwidth and buffers and users purchase freely resources 
to meet their desired quality. Users make their decisions based 
on their own traffic parameters and delay requirements and 
the network sets prices for those resources. The procedure is 
iterative in that the network periodically adjusts prices based on 
monitored user demand, and is decentralized in that only local 
information is needed for individual users to determine resource 
requests. We derive network’s adjustment scheme and users’ 
decision rule and establish their optimality. Since our approach 
does not require the network to know user traffic and delay 
parameters, it does not require traffic policing on the part of 
the network. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
N THIS PAPER, we study a different approach to provi- I sioning services in an ATM network. A service is specified 
by a one-way connection (source, destination, route) and two 
sets of service parameters. A connection is used to transport a 
data stream or message from the source to the destination; 
the traffic parameters specify constraint on a user’s traffic 
‘burstiness’; the quality parameters specify maximum end-to- 
end delay and cell loss rate.’ We assume that the network 
offers for sale different types of services, differentiated by 
the triplet (connection, traffic parameters, quality parameters), 
and that there is a flow, depending on the service cost, of user 
requests for these services. A service request is admitted if 
sufficient resources can be allocated along the connection’s 
route to guarantee service quality. By resources, we mean the 
bandwidth and buffers in each node along the route. Before 
transmission, a message is segmented into small, fixed size 
units called cells. The bandwidth and buffers allocated to a 
connection can vary over links in its route. 
More specifically, a network offers a set S of services. A 
unit of type s service is provided by a type s connection with 
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We permit no cell loss in this paper though this can be generalized; see 
Section II. 
the associated traffic and quality parameters, and is sold for 
a unit price of 20,. The network can produce any amount of 
type s service provided the required resources do not exceed 
capacity. Users request services to maximize their individual 
utilities subject to budget constraints, and the result of this 
maximization is summarized by an aggregate demand function 
Ds(ws)? Further assume that the network is regulated to 
charge its services so as to maximize a welfare function: 
max W’(w,x) (1) 
2 s  I Ds(ws), E s (2) 
W F  
subject to f(x) I 0 
where W’(w, x) is the sum of network revenue and user sur- 
plus, and (2) is capacity constraint. Standard price-adjustment 
schemes [21, pp. 188-1891 can be used to reach an equilib- 
rium, in which the network sets a price w and supply 2, users 
present their demands Ds(ws), and the network increases or 
decreases price according as demand is greater or less than 
supply, until (20, x) converges. 
A key observation is that bandwidth and buffers are “sub- 
stitutible resources” to meet a service quality (see below). 
In this paper, we exploit this tradeoff of different resource 
combinations to optimize an overall measure of network per- 
formance. For each allocation indexed by p, let W ( p )  denote 
the welfare achieved in (1) by an equilibrium price-supply 
vector (w(p),x(p)). Our objective is to derive an iterative 
and decentralized algorithm that solves for a p* that meets 
service quality and maximizes W ( p ) .  The algorithm leads 
to our service provisioning procedure in which the network 
offers directly for rent its bandwidth and buffers, and the users 
purchase freely resources to meet its desired quality. A user 
bases its decision on the knowledge of its own traffic and 
quality parameters, and on the resource price. The network 
periodically adjusts the prices based on the monitored user 
request for resources. Unlike the common price adjustment 
scheme based on the law of demand and supply, our scheme 
involves a minimization by the network. Furthermore, users 
of type s service effectively do two optimization in each 
period: one selects a resource combination along the route to 
minimize service cost w,; the other selects a demand Ds(ws) 
that maximizes surplus. It is decentralized in that each user 
only needs to know the resource price at nodes along its 
route in addition to its own traffic and quality parameters. The 
solution makes critical use of the bandwidth-buffer tradeoff 
*We assume that demand function can be easily measured by counting the 
number of service requests, both admitted and rejected. 
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-+-I display described by burstiness curve in [16], [17]: for the network, it determines the resource combination to maximize welfare; 
for individual users, it provides a simple rule for requesting 
resources (see (19)). 
Our approach differs in three ways from the conventional 
beforehand resources to be allocated to the users. First, under 
our approach, users freely rent resources and package them 
into services that best meet their needs. Second, since service 
price is the rent a user pays for the resources it reserves, our 
m(t) Mbps buffers 
needed 
(2800 cells) 
service provisioning approach in which the network decides 
procedure ties this price to network performance measured by t ms 
the welfare function. Third, since the network only guarantees 0 14 33 47 
the availability of purchased resources, it is the users’ responsi- 
bility to shape their traffic in order that the allocated resources 
Fig. 1. Tradeoff between bandwidth and buffers. 
can provide the desired quality. Our approach relieves the 
network of the difficult task of traffic policing and enforcement 
and can potentially adapt to time-varying user needs expressed 
by the traffic and quality parameters. 
Several sets of previous work are relevant here. In con- 
ventional packet-switched networks, bandwidth and buffers 
are typically not reserved for connections but shared on 
an on-demand basis. Unrestricted sharing makes it difficult 
for the network to offer a guaranteed delay to a particular 
connection, since a more bursty connection can monopolize 
network resources to the detriment of other connections, 
possibly leading to congestion. As a consequence of the need 
to guarantee serviec quality in an ATM network, various 
bandwidth allocation schemes have recently been designed 
to guarantee certain amount of bandwidth to a connection 
despite changes in the number and burstiness of concurrent 
connections, e.g., [lo], [25], [51, [201, 121, [71, 1221. This 
justifies our approximation of each network node as allocating 
a fixed bandwidth to a connection. The next question is how 
much bandwidth to allocate to each connection. To secure 
service quality, a common proposal is to allocate to each 
connection enough bandwidth to accommodate its peak rate. 
This simple proposal leads to inefficiency if the peak rate is 
much larger than its average rate. This may be unnecessary 
if the tradeoff between bandwidth and buffers as substitutible 
resources for service provisioning can be exploited. A more 
sophisticated proposal is based on the notion of a connection’s 
“equivalent bandwidth” [13], [61, 1141, [3]. References [ l l ] ,  
[12] study the effect on some overall measure of network 
performance of varying resource capacities in the network 
and of varying routing. We vary the resource allocation to the 
connections rather than the resource capacity, exploiting the 
bandwidth-buffer tradeoff. Multiple-service-multiple-resource 
model is also considered in [SI. There the resource allocation 
is fixed, and the problem is to find a revenue-maximizing 
admission control policy that may reject a request even when 
sufficient resources are available in the hope of more profitable 
requests in the future. In the present formulation resources 
cannot be reserved in anticipation of future requests. Instead 
we explore alternative feasible allocations. Pricing has been 
used previously for control and optimization in communication 
networks, e.g., [4], [15]. 
The tradeoff between bandwidth and buffers is easily illus- 
trated. Consider the transfer over a single link of a sequence of 
video frames; see Fig. 1. Suppose a frame contains 512 x 512 
8-bit pixels, and is generated at the video source every 33 ms. 
The service is to deliver a frame every 33 ms to the display. 
Suppose the source rate is m(t) as shown in the figure. If 
we allocate the peak rate 150 Mbps then the received rate 
is the same as m(t) (except for propagation and processing 
delay). An alternative is to allocate 65 Mbps and some buffers 
to the connection; the received rate m’(t) is as shown. The 
alternative allocation achieves the same service as shown in 
the figure. 
In Section 11, we introduce our network model and service 
parameters. In Section 111, we define optimality and formulate 
optimal allocation as a game problem. Its solution leads to our 
iterative and decentralized service provisioning procedure that 
does not require the network to know user traffic and quality 
parameters. Concluding remarks are collected in Section IV, 
and proofs are relegated to the Appendix. 
While our argument is preliminary, it does suggest an 
alternative to the popular approach in which the network 
decides which services will best meet user needs. Here, the 
users decide the resources they need based on their own traffic 
and quality parameters, and the network coordinates their 
choices via resource pricing in order to optimize an overall 
measure of network performance. 
11. MODEL 
We consider a network with a set L of links. Link 1 E L 
comprises a transmission capacity of c6 cells per second, or 
cps, and buffers for Bl cells, see Fig. 2. A set R of routes 
is specified; T E R also denotes the set of links along that 
route. The network offers a set S of services. A unit of 
type s service is sold at a price of wS3 and is provided 
by a connection over route T ,  for one unit of time. Under 
our service provisioning scheme, this unit price w, is related 
to the cost of resources needed to provide the service, and 
is adjusted periodically to achieve an optimal allocation, as 
elaborated in Section 111. We shall assume that user demand, 
or requests, for type s service is given by the aggregate demand 
function D,(w,) = v,ezp(-w,),v, := X,T,. X,ezp(-w,) is 
the (average) rate type s requests arrive and T, is the (average) 
duration of a type s connection. A type s request is admitted 
3The price ws may be some fictitious currency for control purposes that 
the network can adjust at will. 
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Fig. 2. Network model. 
and assigned a connection with route T,  provided there is 
available spare bandwidth of pl, cps and spare buffers for 
bl, cells, in each link 1 E T,. The routing s + T,  is fixed, 
but the allocation 
+ { I l l s ,  bls; 1 E T s }  
can be freely chosen provided the service quality constraint is 
met as explained next. 
Once a type s request is admitted, a connection is set up, 
and the user sends a message. A message is a “fluid flow,” 
m(t),O 5 t 5 T, where m(t) is the instantaneous rate in 
cps, and T is the duration. A type s message must satisfy 
two constraints denoted by ( b s ( p ) ,  &). The parameter & is a 
positive real number that bounds the average message rate. It 
is also the minimum bandwidth required for a type s message 
at each node along its route. The parameter b, (p) ,  p 2 0, is 
a nonnegative, decreasing, convex function that bounds the 
message “burstiness.” A type s message m is said to be 
compliant if 
(3) 
and 
T 
[m(T> - PId7 I b&), CL 2 77 (4) 
Inequality (3) says that the average message rate 77 cannot 
exceed k.  The left-hand side of (4) is the maximum backlog 
if m is transmitted over a link at a constant speed p 2 7. 
Hence, inequality (4) says that if m is allocated a bandwidth 
of p, then a buffer of size b, ( p )  is sufficient to prevent cell loss. 
Note that the larger is p the smaller is b, (p ) .  Thus the function 
b,, called burstiness curve, gives the bandwidth-buffer tradeoff 
for zero cell loss. To incorporate cell loss, we may relax (4) 
and let b, (p)  be the buffer required to have no more than 
certain number of lost cells if m is transmitted over a link at 
a constant speed p [23]. 
A word is in order on how this traffic characterization may 
be used in practice. First, if the duration of a message is very 
long, e.g., a video program, we divide its duration into disjoint 
periods T;, i = 1 , .  . . , I C .  A type s message is compliant if the 
portion of message on every period Ti satisfies (3) and (4) 
with T replaced by Ti. Inequality (3) then guarantees that 
no cell backlog carries over to the next period. Second, we 
do not assume that a user of type s service knows its own 
message m(t) or the burstiness of m(t). We only assume that 
they know a bound b , ( p ) , p  2 77, on the burstiness. In fact, 
condition (4) can be easily enforced by passing an arbitrary 
user message through a leaky bucket policing device before 
being admitted into the network. The two parameters of a 
leaky bucket (and the bound on peak message rate in each 
period) define a piecewise linear burstiness curve that bounds 
the burstiness of the output message from the leaky bucket 
[17, Proposition 31. 
For the rest of this paper, we will use the following 
vector notation. p, denotes the vector {pl,, I E T , }  of 
bandwidth allocation for a type s connection, and p denotes 
the vector {p,, s E S}. Similarly, b, (ps)  denotes the vector 
{bs(pls) ,  1 E T,}  of buffers required for a type s connection, 
and b ( p )  denotes the vector {bs (p , ) ,  s E S}. p denotes the 
vector {e,, s E S}. We may abuse notation anruse “ p  2 p” 
to mean “{pl, 2 E,; I E T , , S  E S}.” Finally, < x , y 5  
denotes the inner product of vectors z and y. 
To specify the quality of service, the maximum end-to- 
end delay, we use two results from the theory of burstiness 
curve in [16]-[18] (see also [l], [20], [24]). Suppose a type s 
compliant message is transmitted over a connection with route 
T,. Suppose that a bandwidth of pl, cps and buffer of bl, cells 
are allocated to that connection at each link I E T,. Suppose 
that the allocation {pl,, bl,, I E T , }  satisfies 
P l S  2 &, bls 2 b s ( P l s ) ,  I E rs (5) 
i.e., at each link, the allocated bandwidth exceeds the minimum 
bandwidth p,, and the allocated buffer exceeds the burstiness 
constraint. Then, (i) no cells will be lost at any link I E T,  
[16, Proposition 41, and (ii) the end-to-end delay is at most 
[ 16, Theorem 31 
b s ( E s )  + propagation and processing delay 
We shall assume that the “propagation and processing delay” is 
constant and omit it from further consideration. Consequently, 
a maximum end-to-end delay translates into the minimum 
bandwidth & required at each link along the route. 
In summary, there are two service parameters for type s 
service: the burstiness curve b,, and the minimum bandwidth 
p required at each link along the route. A user message is 
compliant if it satisfies (3) and (4). An allocation {pl,, bl,; 1 E 
T,}  is compliant if it satisfies (5). Given service parameters, 
{b , ,  k; s E S}, we want to find a compliant allocation 
( p , b )  = {pl,,bl,;Z E T , , S  E S }  that is “optimal.” We will 
restrict ourselves to allocations with bl, = bs(p ls ) .  since this 
is sufficient to prevent cell loss. We henceforth represent an 
allocation by a vector p = {pls ,bs(pls);  I E T,, s E S}. 
We now formulate the problem and present a solution, which 
leads to a different approach to service provisioning. 
& 
4 
III. OPTIMAL ALLOCATTON AND 
SERVICE PROVISIONING PROCEDURE 
The network can produce any amount x, of type s service, 
provided that sufficient resources are available, i.e., 
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b s ( p l s )  5 B ~ ,  1 E L (7) in a ,  /?, we obtain an alternative expression for the maximum 
5 welfare, 
and expects a revenue of Cx,w,. The aggregate demand W P )  = (asko G(P1 a ,  P )  
function summarizes the users’ utility such that 
is the user surplus [21]. Take as social welfare 
W’(w, z, p )  := L: D,(v)dv + c x s w ,  + < a ,  C > + < P, B > 
so the problem is to maximize W’(W, 2, p )  subject to (6) and 
(7). Consider initially a fixed allocation p 2 p. 
{ws ( p ) ,  5,  ( p ) ;  s E S }  form an equilibrium if, for aEl {xS} 
satisfying (6) and (7), 
Hence, P* is a welfare-maximizing allocation if 
Definition I :  A set ofprices and amounts of service produced w(p*) = ” w(p) = min G(p, a ,  p)  (14) 
The following result is key to our solution. Note that G is 
Proposition 2: There exists a saddle-point (p* ,  a* , p*) to the 
cL2E cL2c (..$)a 
convex in (a,,@ but not generally concave in p. 
max-min problem (14) that is welfare-maximizing, i.e., z s b )  = y s  exp [-ws(cL)] (*) 
czs(P)ws(P) 2 c~sw.s(P) (9) 
G(P* , a*, P * )  
The conditions say that, in equilibrium, user demand is met 
Proposition I: (w. ( p ) ,  IC, ( p ) )  is an equilibrium ifand only if 
and the network maximizes revenue. 
there exist (a(p),  p ( p ) )  2 0 such that 
Note that the max-min problem in the proposition is equiv- 
alent to the following game: for all s E S ,  
Note that (12) says that the equilibrium price equals the 
resource cost for providing that service. The cost is estimated 
by taking as the “shadow” price or rent of al(p) per cps of 
bandwidth and & ( p )  per cell of buffer, in link 1. 
It can be verified that there is a unique equilibrium, that 
the equilibrium maximizes W’(w,x,p) over w 2 0, z 2 0 
subject to (7), and that the maximum welfare is 
Now suppose p 2 p can be freely chosen. We can now 
formally define an optimal allocation. 
Definition 2: An allocation p is optimal, or welfare maximiz- 
ing, if it maximizes the welfare W ( p )  in (13). 
To directly maximizing (13) the network needs to know user 
traffic and quality parameters ( b s ,  E,). We propose a different 
approach which does not require such knowledge, and hence 
does not require any traffic policing and enforcement on the 
part of the network, though users may still want to shape their 
messages to comply with (bsl E,) so that the end-to-end delay 
is met. From (10) and (11) and the convexity of G(p,a,P) 
where we recall that p, = {pl,,  1 E T , } .  The proposition 
says that if player N chooses the minimizer (a*,  p*), then 
player U, will choose the optimal p: since (p*,a*,/3*) is 
a saddle point. Note again that a and /3 in (15) can be 
conveniently interpreted as the rent for one unit of bandwidth 
and buffer, respectively. Even though the minimizer (a* , p*)  
for min,,p G(p* ,  a,  p) may not be unique, it can be shown 
that the unit price w: = $ ~ l c , , ( a r p l $  + P;bs(pf$))  for 
type s service is the same regardless of which minimizer is 
used as resource price. 
This interpretation suggests the following service provision- 
ing procedure to reach (p* , a* , p*). The procedure is based on 
an algorithm to solve the following equivalent game problem 
Problem (17) is equivalent to (15) since the objective function 
in (15) is separable in pl,. 
Suppose the network charges each user during connection 
setup a rent of a1 per cps of bandwidth and pl per cell of 
buffer in link 1. The expected cost to a user per request of 
I I I  I I 
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type s is then4 
C(alPc, + P l b S ( P 1 S ) )  (18) 
I E r ,  
Users may rent any amounts of bandwidth pl, 2 and 
buffers b,(p(,)  at each link 1 E r,. We assume that, given 
prices (a, p), users will try to minimize their expected service 
cost (18), subject to their own quality requirement p, 2 14,. 
That is, they will take on the role of U, in (15). We let 
the network take on the role of N in (16) to calculate 
the price (a,@). As noted above, if the network charges 
according to (a*,P*), then users will indeed request the 
optimal allocation p*. The following procedure will allow the 
network to compute a*, P* even if it may have no knowledge 
of user needs expressed by the traffic and quality parameters 
{bs,y;s  E SI. 
A. Service Provisioning Procedure 
Network Algorithm: 
1) Network initializes the update period n = 0. 
2) It posts a rent (a", P") in period n for resources at each 
link. 
3) It monitors the requested bandwidth and buffers (p", b") 
in the entire network, and uses this observed (p", b") to 
solve 
+ < a , C >  + < P , B >  
period. It increments n, and go to step 2. 
4) It uses any minimizer as rent (a"+l,p"+l) in the next 
User Algorithm: In period n, 
1) A user of type s service solves (using (19) below) 
for minimizer p2", and b2", = bs(p2",). 
available, and rejected otherwise. 
2) It requests (pz ,bF)  and is admitted if resources are 
3) If admitted, it pays the rent CIEr,(a~pI", + Prbl",). 
The optimality of the procedure is assured by the following 
Theorem 1 : Given (a', Po) ,  construct a sequence (p" , a"+', 
theorem. 
P+'), 12 L 0, by 
1 E r , , s  E S 
Then any accumulation point of the sequence (p" , a"+', p"+') 
is a saddle point of G. 
The decentralized nature of the procedure is striking: 
given the price (a,p), the bandwidth and buffer request 
41n charging a user the service cost (18), we implicitly assume that the 
user does not know the burstiness of its own message but only its bound b, 
that can be easily enforced by a leaky bucket. This does not lose generality, 
since if some of the users know a better bound, we may separate them into a 
different service type s' without changing the argument. 
55 1 
(pis, b,(pl,))  at link 1 of route r, that minimizes the service 
cost (18) depends only on the rent at link 1. In fact, given 
(a, p), the cost minimizing pl, satisfies, by the Kuhn-Tucker 
theorem [ 191, 
at d 
p;, = M, if - > -b,(M,) (19) 
P; dP 
Here, M, is the peak message rate at which b,(M,) = 0. 
Since b,(pls) is strictly decreasing and convex for pl, < M, 
the optimal p;, is unique for each (a*,p*). Hence, in each 
period n, a user minimizes the expected cost (18) by requesting 
resources according to (19); and this computation can be 
done locally for each link along the route. By Theorem 1, 
the service provisioning procedure will achieve a welfare- 
maximizing allocation. The optimal price (a*, P * )  determines 
a minimum-cost allocation p*. (p* ,  a*, P* )  yields the service 
price w* and the amount x: = Ds(w*) of service produced 
that form an equilibrium. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We have studied an altemative approach to service pro- 
visioning in an ATM network, which does not require the 
network to know user needs. In this approach, the network 
offers directly for rent its bandwidth and buffers and the users 
purchase them freely to meet their desired quality. The service 
provisioning procedure is based on a solution of the problem 
of allocating bandwidth and buffers to meet several types of 
service requests, differentiated by bounds on the average rate 
and burstiness of the message and on the end-to-end delay. 
The model has one serious deficiency. Once network re- 
sources are allocated to a service request, those resources 
cannot be shared by other connections. Such "exclusion" is 
necessary since no cell loss is allowed. However, if one does 
permit cell loss (as a service quality parameter), then it is pos- 
sible, indeed desirable, to share resources among concurrent 
connections, i.e. to permit statistical multiplexing. This will 
require an understanding of the interaction between resource 
allocations, cell loss, and delay. A preliminary attempt in this 
direction is reported in [23]. 
APPENDIX 
Proof of Proposition 1 :  By the duality theorem of linear 
programming, (x,(p)) satisfies (9) if and only if there exists 
( Q b ) , P ( P ) )  2 0 such that 
1 E (  < 4 P ) , P s  > + < P b L b S b S )  > ) L %(PI 
with equality if z,(p) > 0. Moreover, 
G ( P ) W S ( P )  =< 4 P > ,  c > + < P b ) ,  B > 
The result now follows upon noting that, in equilibrium, 
0 x s ( p )  = vse~~[-ws(p)I  > 0. 
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We now proceed to the proof of Proposition 2 and Theorem 
1. Since G(p, a,P) is not concave in p, we will use a 
generalization of von Neumann’s minimax theorem due to 
Kakutani [9]. 
Suppose that M, is the bound on the peak rate for a 
type s message, i.e. b,(M,) = 0. Then, in the zero-sum 
game of the proposition, we may restrict the strategy set for 
players U,, s E S, who maximize G(p, a,  P),  to the following 
compact and convex set 
s1 := { P  I E, 5 P l S  5 Ms;l E T 5 , S  E S) 
Since G(p, 0,O) = E, v,, we may restrict the strategy set 
for player N ,  who minimizes G ( p ,  a,  P), to the following 
compact and convex set 
sz := { ( a ,  P )  2 0 I C(.lCl + a&) 5 U,} 
1 5 
For each ( a ,  P) ,  player 17,’s optimal strategy R l ( a ,  P),  given 
by (19), is unique. For each p, denote by R z ( p )  the set of 
minimizers for (16). Both R1 and R2 are nonempty. The 
convexity of G in (a,P) implies that R z ( p )  is convex for 
each p. 
Lemma 1 :  R1 is continuous on Sz. R2 is upper semi- 
continuous on S I ,  i.e., if p” ---f p*, (an,,f3”) E Rz(pLn) and 
(a“,P”) + (a*,P*), then (a*,@*) E Rz(p*) .  
Proof: We shall prove that Rz is upper semi-continuous. 
The proof for R1 is similar. Suppose in contradiction that 
(a * ,p * )  R z ( p * ) .  Fix (S,@ E Rz(p*) .  Then 
t := G(p*,a* ,P*)  - G ( p * , t i , j )  > 0 
By continuity of G, for sufficiently large n, 
Continuity& of G at (p* ,  ti, j) guarantees a neighborhood 
N ( p * ,  ti, P )  of (,U*, 6, P )  in S1 x S2 such that for sufficiently 
large n, for all (p”,  a,  P )  E ~ ( p * ,  ti, j), 
G b ” ,  ( I ,  P )  L G(P*, 4 P )  + f 
= G(p*, a*, P * )  - (By definition of t) 
< G(CL”, an, P”)  (BY (20)) 
contradicting (an, P” )  E Rz(p”) .  0 
Proof of Proposition 2:  To prove the existence of a sad- 
dle point, define the mapping x : S1 x 52 + 2s1xsz 
%here 2” xs2 denotes the collection of all subsets of S1 x SZ. 
( p * ,  a* ,p*)  is a saddle point if and only if it is a fixed point 
of x, because 
(P* ,Q* ,P* )  E x(CL*,a*,P*) 
is equivalent to 
P* E Ri(a* ,P*)  
(a*,P*) E RZ(P*) 
which is equivalent to 
G(p,a*,P*) 5 Gb*,a* ,P* )  I Gb* ,a ,P )  
for all (p,  a,  P )  E S1 x SZ We will prove that x has a fixed 
point using Kakutani’s theorem [9] which states that, given a 
compact and convex set X ,  if f is an upper semi-continuous 
function which assigns to each x E X a closed and convex 
subset of X ,  then there exists some x E X such that x E f(x). 
Now S1 x 5’2 is compact and convex, and by Lemma 1 x 
is upper semi-continuous. x(p,a,P)  = R ~ ( a , p )  x R z ( p )  
is convex since each component is. We only need to show 
that x(p, a,  P )  is closed. R l ( a ,  P )  is a singleton and hence 
closed. The continuity of G implies that R z ( p )  is closed. 
0 
Proof of Theorem 1 :  Since S1 x SZ is compact, accumu- 
Hence x(p,  a ,  0) is closed. 
lation points of (p”,  an+’, P n + l )  always exist. 
Define the mapping $ : SI x SZ + 2” xs2 
$(P,  a,  P )  = (&(a, P) ,  Rz(R1(a, P ) )  
Note that if player N starts with the strategy (a ,p) ,  then 
players U,, s E S ,  will pick R1 (a ,  P), to which N will respond 
by picking a strategy in Rz(Rl (a ,P) ) ,  and so forth. The 
following three observations complete the proof 
1) The sequence in the theorem can be constructed, given 
(ao,Po), by ( P ” , ~ ” + ’ , P ” + ~ )  E $ ( ~ ” - l , a ” , P ” )  
2 )  If { ~ “ ( ‘ 1 ,  a”(’)+’, /3n(k) f1}  is a subsequence converg- 
ing to (p* ,  a*, P*) ,  then by the upper semi-continuity of 
$ and the first observation, ( p * ,  a*, /3*) is a fixed point 
of $, i.e. (p* ,a* ,P* )  E $(p*,  a*,P*). 
3) As in the proof of Proposition 2,  (p* ,  a*, P * )  is a fixed 
point of $ if and only if it is a saddle point. 0 
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